What types of AI training do leadership teams really need?

Tool fluency is not organisational readiness

Most training agendas start where the noise is loudest: user interfaces. Yet the largest value and the largest risk appear when AI changes how work is designed, measured, and assured.

Why AI training keeps missing the point?

Many teams treat AI like another productivity suite rollout: a quick enablement sprint, a handful of champions, and a line in the digital roadmap. That assumption held when software mainly changed individual tasks. AI more often changes decision flows. When an automated triage model redirects claims, or a generative assistant drafts customer responses, the system shifts accountability, cycle times, evidence trails, and the shape of operational risk.

In practical terms, the question becomes less “Can people use the tool?” and more “Can the organisation explain and defend the work it now performs differently?” Regulators and boards increasingly expect that answer, especially under regimes such as GDPR, the EU AI Act, and expanding guidance from supervisory bodies and information commissioners.

What is changing in the economics?

AI can compress costs per case, but it can also create new costs per incident. A contact centre that reduces average handling time by 10 to 25 percent through assisted drafting may also see a rise in escalations if tone, accuracy, or disclosure handling degrade. The same operational change can produce both savings and liabilities, depending on governance and quality control. Training that ignores that duality encourages naive rollouts and defensive backlash in equal measure.

Decision literacy for probabilistic systems

AI does not behave like deterministic software. It behaves like a system that is usually right, sometimes wrong in novel ways, and difficult to exhaustively test. This changes what good judgement looks like.

How does uncertainty change management decisions?

With classical automation, the key question is specification: is the rule correct and complete? With AI, the question often becomes: what level of error is tolerable, and in which contexts? A fraud model with a low false negative rate may still be unacceptable if false positives trigger account freezes for vulnerable customers. A drafting assistant that is accurate most of the time may still be unacceptable in regulated advice contexts. Training needs to build comfort with probabilistic thinking, including base rates, error trade-offs, and the limits of offline validation.

This is less about becoming data scientists and more about becoming competent consumers of AI performance claims. What evidence should be required before changing a workflow? How should performance drift be detected? When is a “good enough” model a material risk because the tail events matter more than the average?

Where is human oversight non-negotiable?

Oversight is not a slogan. It is a design decision about who can approve, who can challenge, and who can override. The interesting training is scenario-based: the model produces an output that is plausible, wrong, and time-pressured. What happens next in the process? Who has authority to halt the system? What is recorded, and what is communicated externally?

At LSI, one useful pattern has been repeatable decision simulations that let senior teams rehearse incidents and trade-offs without waiting for a real failure. The aim is not to create perfect policies, but to build shared reflexes about escalation, documentation, and accountability.

Governance that matches real workflows

AI governance often arrives as a central policy document. Value and risk, however, emerge in the messy middle: handoffs, exceptions, and incentives. Training should make governance operational rather than ceremonial.

What should be centralised and what should be federated?

Centralisation can reduce duplicated spend and inconsistent controls, but it can also slow adoption and create shadow experimentation. Federated models can move faster, but they can multiply risk if assurance is uneven. The right balance depends on where models touch regulated decisions, where data quality is variable, and how quickly products change.

A practical training outcome is the ability to argue for an operating model using evidence: for example, centralising model risk management, common evaluation standards, and vendor contracting; while federating use-case discovery, process redesign, and adoption change.

Which roles need new responsibilities?

AI-native organisations often invent roles informally before they formalise them: process owners who can redesign work, risk partners who understand model behaviour, product managers who treat models as evolving services rather than one-off projects. Training should clarify decision rights. Who signs off a model entering production? Who owns the ongoing cost of monitoring? Who is accountable when an automated recommendation triggers harm?

Without this clarity, organisations get a familiar anti-pattern: impressive pilots that cannot pass audit, cannot scale to multiple business units, and quietly die after executive sponsorship rotates.

Portfolio discipline beyond the pilot phase

The hard part is not choosing the first use case. The hard part is building a repeatable machine that selects, funds, assures, and retires use cases while keeping delivery credible.

How should use cases be selected and sequenced?

Selection tends to overvalue novelty and undervalue operability. A generative assistant for internal knowledge may deliver 5 to 15 percent productivity in some functions, but only if knowledge is curated, permissions are correct, and usage is measurable. A document extraction model might have a clearer ROI, yet still fail if exception handling is not redesigned.

Training should build the ability to assess each candidate by unit economics and controllability: cost per transaction, expected cycle time reduction, cost of assurance, cost of change, and reversibility if outcomes disappoint. A portfolio view also prevents a single high-profile pilot from consuming the oxygen needed to industrialise simpler wins.

What cadence keeps delivery honest?

AI work benefits from a rhythm that combines experimentation with operational review. The useful training is governance-as-cadence: monthly portfolio reviews that examine benefit realisation, model performance drift, incident reports, and adoption measures. This shifts AI from “project theatre” to a managed operational capability, closer to how risk, finance, and operations already run.

Measuring ROI without fooling anyone

AI benefits are easy to claim and hard to bank. The measurement challenge is not just attribution, but the temptation to count activity rather than outcomes. Training should strengthen financial and operational measurement habits around AI.

Which metrics show value early?

Leading indicators help avoid waiting for quarterly financials. Examples include deflection rate in service, time-to-first-draft in legal or policy work, straight-through processing percentage in operations, and rework rates where AI outputs are edited. These can be measured weekly and tied to workflow instrumentation.

Lagging indicators are still essential: cost per case, revenue per employee, compliance findings, customer complaints, churn in sensitive segments, and incident costs. A cautious organisation may require that savings only count once sustained for a period, and only after assurance costs are netted off.

How to avoid “productivity mirages”?

AI can shift work rather than remove it. A 20 percent reduction in handling time can be consumed by increased volume, higher quality expectations, or more exception processing. Training should help surface the full system effect, including second-order impacts such as supervisory workload, model monitoring costs, and legal review time.

There is also a reputational balance sheet. A small number of high-visibility failures can erase the gains of many successful automations. ROI thinking needs to include downside scenarios, not as fear, but as basic investment hygiene.

Capability building that changes behaviour

Training only matters if it shifts decisions and incentives. The goal is not universal mastery, but targeted competence: enough shared language to make decisions, and enough depth in key roles to keep AI safe and scalable.

What types of training are actually required?

One layer is board-level and executive education focused on decision quality: model risk, regulatory exposure, accountability, portfolio economics, and incident readiness. Another layer is for operational owners: how workflows change, how exceptions are handled, how performance is monitored, and how to keep humans meaningfully in the loop. A further layer is for control functions: audit, compliance, legal, security, and procurement, so controls accelerate rather than paralyse delivery.

The content is less “how to prompt” and more “how to run an AI-affected business process”. It is also less classroom and more rehearsal: tabletop exercises, scenario role-play, and post-implementation reviews that build a culture of learning rather than blame.

Which decision test signals AI-native maturity?

A useful test is whether an organisation can answer, with evidence, a short set of questions: what value is being captured, where does risk concentrate, who can stop the system, and what happens when the model is wrong in a new way? If those answers depend on one or two enthusiasts, training has not created resilience.

The uncomfortable question is this: if tomorrow brought a public incident caused by an AI-enabled workflow, would the organisation be able to show that its training, governance, and measurement were designed for truth rather than optimism?